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Abstract
During the normal operation of a Cloud solution, no one pays attention to the logs except the system
reliability engineers, who may periodically check them to ensure that the Cloud platform’s performance
conforms to the Service Level Agreements (SLA). However, the moment a component fails, or a cus-
tomer complains about a breach of SLA, the importance of logs increases significantly. All departments,
including management, customer support, and even the actual customer, may turn to logs to determine
the cause and timeline of the issue and to find the party responsible for the issue. The party at fault may
be motivated to tamper with the logs to hide their role. Given the number and volume of logs generated
by the Cloud platforms, many tampering opportunities exist. We argue that the critical nature of logs
calls for immutability and verification mechanism without the presence of a single trusted party.
This paper proposes such a mechanism by describing a blockchain-based log system, called Logchain,
which can be integrated with existing private and public blockchain solutions. Logchain uses the im-
mutability feature of blockchain to provide a tamper-resistance storage platform for log storage. Addi-
tionally, we propose a hierarchical structure to combine the hash-binding of two blockchains to address
blockchains’ scalability issues. To validate the mechanism, we integrate Logchain into two different types
of blockchains. We choose Ethereum as a public, permission-less blockchain and IBM Blockchain as
a private, permission-based one. We show that the solution is scalable on both the private and pub-
lic blockchains. Additionally, we perform the analysis of the cost of ownership for private and public
blockchains implementations to help a reader selecting an implementation that would be applicable to
their needs.
The Logchain’s scalability improvement on a blockchain is achieved without any alteration on the
fundamental architecture of blockchains. As shown in this work, it can function on private and public
blockchains and, therefore, can be a suitable alternative for organizations that need a secure, immutable
log storage platform.
1 Introduction
In the majority of Cloud offerings, there are two parties involved. A Cloud Service Provider (CSP) owns a
pool of computing resources and offers them at predefined prices to a Cloud Service Consumer (CSC) via
the Internet.
The CSP uses continued monitoring to ensure that the current Quality of Service (QoS) provided to the
CSC matches with the one in the signed Service Level Agreement (SLA). When a technical issue arises, the
CSC will be one of the parties that become interested in reviewing and assessing the logs, because logs hold
the truth about the delivered QoS.
Full access to all resources (e.g., bare-metal servers, networking components, cloud management plat-
forms, and virtualization tools) is required to deploy holistic monitoring solutions [1], and such access is only
available to the CSP.
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While the full control over monitoring systems and generated logs allows CSPs to monitor and maintain
Cloud services efficiently, it gives them a controversial power over evidential resources that are important to
CSCs. That is, logs are generated and stored on a platform, which is built, managed, and owned by a CSP.
Hence, CSPs have full permission on all collected logs. Such situations cause many trust-related issues.
Log tampering actions include adding, removing, and manipulating a log partially or entirely. Moreover,
log tampering may affect CSCs financially and technically. If a CSP tampers with the logs related to resource
usage and overcharges the customer, or if a CSP hides the breach of one or more criteria of an SLA, the
CSC is in immediate need of finding a method or a tool to verify the integrity of data provided by the CSP.
Logs are evidential documents [2]. They contain all the details and QoS metrics related to the operation
of software, network components, servers, and Cloud platforms. As a key element in computer forensic
investigations, logs are presentable in the court of law [3, 4] only if they satisfy the legal requirement such
as authenticity, reliability, and admissibility.
Here, tamper-motivation is defined as the desire of one or more of the parties involved in a platform,
infrastructure, or Cloud solution to access critical logs and tamper with these logs by adding, removing, or
manipulating a part or the entire log.
Below, we provide three examples of situations where there may be motivation to tamper with logs related
to private, community, and public Clouds.
Example 1. In a private Cloud, a unique type of tamper-motivation may exist. Imagine a company that
has established a private Cloud. The management team has requested from the Information Technology
(IT) department a full second-by-second backup for all of the company’s financial data. The IT department
configures its backup systems and ensures that there is enough space for continuous backup of transactions.
Months after the initial setup, the company’s primary storage is affected by a hardware failure. The IT
department finds out that the real-time backup system has stopped working a few days ago and had sent
several alerts that no one in the IT department noticed. The IT department is the only department that
has access to all the logs. Thus, the department may be motivated to tamper with the logs to cover up the
problem.
Example 2. A community Cloud [5] requires a clear definition of responsibilities for each partner. In case
of an unfortunate incident, the party at fault may be motivated to tamper with the logs that identify them
as the party responsible for the issue. Even worse, they may try to tamper with the logs and fabricate a
scenario where another party becomes the main reason behind failure. Having access to the logs for one or
more of the parties in a community Cloud may cause trust issues that call for the logs’ immutability.
Example 3. As for the public Cloud, the platform’s operational health, performance, generated metrics,
and even charge-back reports (that are consolidated in the form of monthly invoices to CSCs) are entirely
managed by CSPs. Without having access to the actual logs or the actual infrastructure, CSCs of the public
Clouds are in a very unfair, dependent position. Consider a scenario in which a CSC deploys an application
on an elastic Cloud environment with an auto-scaling feature and defines a rule that when the memory usage
exceeds 80%, the CSP should allocate 20% extra memory space to the deployed application. Imagine that
the CSC receives complaints related to the application performance from its users. The CSC asks the CSP
to send a detailed report of the elastic memory allocation. The CSP’s IT team checks their logs and finds
out that the auto-scaling feature has worked intermittently, hence the performance issue. If the CSC finds
out the truth, there may be a lawsuit on the horizon. Thus, the IT team may be motivated to tamper with
the log before sending it to the CSC.
Given the existence of many motivations to tamper with logs on the Cloud platforms, the negative
consequences of log tampering for the CSCs, and the inadequacy of existing monitoring solutions, we conclude
that an immutable log system, which is capable of storing the logs and verifying their integrity, can be
genuinely beneficial for the CSCs and can be used to establish trust among Cloud participants. Thus, a CSP
implementing such a system offers a higher level of visibility and promotes a higher level of assurance and
trust. Therefore, implementing Logchain can result in a competitive advantage over other Cloud providers
who do not offer the same level of visibility and assurance.
To address the trust issue of the current Cloud log storage solutions, our objective is to create an
immutable log system called Logchain. We choose blockchain as our data storage model as it has all the
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required features (such as immutability) and can store any type of data. The proposed solution collects logs
from various platforms and stores them in blocks of blockchains. To make the Logchain more accessible, we
construct a Logchain as a Service (LCaaS) by implementing an API that can be used to interact with the
Logchain.
To implement LCaaS, we provide a solution for the main scalability limitation of the blockchain, namely,
the number of computational resources needed to verify each block’s integrity. This is done by designing a
hierarchical ledger.
The main contribution of this paper is to extend the applicability of LCaaS as a hierarchical ledger
from a proprietary, private blockchain to Ethereum as a public blockchain and to IBM Blockchain [6] as a
private blockchain. We refer to these two blockchain platforms collectively as blockchain vendors. We focus
on the primary integration point between LCaaS and blockchain vendors and assess integrated solutions’
performance by measuring the impact of all relevant factors. The incoming transactions per second (tps)
defines the incoming load for the LCaaS. The higher the tps, the more work there is for LCaaS and its
hashing methods. Nevertheless, the tps does not directly impact the number of outgoing transactions to
blockchain vendors. The number of outgoing transactions is defined by the length of lower-level blockchains,
also known as circled blockchains. The longer circled blockchains result in a lower frequency of submission
of blocks to blockchain vendors. While this lower submission makes the integration more feasible (as there
are fewer transactions to be paid for), it creates a longer window of time for logs to be stored locally before
they can be sent to blockchain vendor, hence a higher risk.
While there are solutions that recommend the use of blockchain as a storage option for critical data
(e.g., [7, 8, 9]), to the best of our knowledge, none of them have tried to address the scalability issues of
blockchain platforms for complete and large-scale log storage. As a result, most existing solutions have settled
for partial storage of logs, such as audit logs [10, 11]. While this solves a portion of the problem, we argue
that the entire log storage system has to be immutable. Moreover, blockchains are used as an immutable
storage option for many transaction-related data, but their usage in the non-financial area is still in infancy.
We employ blockchain and use blocks to store logs. To successfully implement our prototype, we had to
provide a solution for the blockchain’s main scalability limitation, namely, the number of computational
resources needed to verify each block’s integrity.
It is essential to mention that each blockchain vendor has vendor-specific configurable items that may
impact the integration’s overall performance. Hence, it is not always possible to compare the performance
of the two implemented solutions. For example, in the case of Ethereum, the gas price is the only factor
that defines the speed at which a miner accepts the transactions and adds it to a block in the public
blockchain. The economics of Ethereum as a public blockchain and the role of gas price are explained in
Section 5.4.3. In the case of IBM blockchain, there is no such concept as gas price; instead, there are different
pricing models [12], and one can choose an appropriate model based on the business needs and budgeting
constraints.
Our prototype constructs LCaaS, receives logs, and stores them in an immutable hierarchical ledger.
Clients can use LCaaS API to interact with the solution and send, verify, and retrieve data from this
immutable storage. The complete source code of the prototype can be accessed via [13].
In addition to using essential characteristics of blockchain technology, we have introduced the following
new additional features that will increase functionality, scalability, and usability of blockchain technologies
for tamper-proof log storage.
We design the proposed solution as a service so that multiple customers can use it concurrently. Moreover,
given that CSCs are already using many X-as-a-Service” solutions, they are accustomed to such a service
offering model. To ensure that the proposed solution can be used in conjunction with the existing blockchain
solutions, we implemented the proposed hierarchical ledger on top of Ethereum.
This manuscript expands [14, 15], which mainly focused on the internal design and implementation of
LCaaS and its interaction with Ethereum blockchain. In this work, we expand the integration of LCaaS onto
a private blockchain platform, namely, IBM Blockchain and then compare the results of LCaaS integration
to two blockchain platforms. We also assess and compare the cost of ownership for the two implementations.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide related works and a brief literature
review on both Cloud computing and blockchain. In Section 3, we review background details on blockchains
and its key concepts such as hashing and binding and provide details for blockchain taxonomies. In Section 4,
we introduce the methodologies that we use to build Logchain, our prototype, and the approaches for en-
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hancing blockchain and its capability, followed by the implementation of the hierarchical ledger. In Section 5,
we present implementation and integration details of LCaaS to blockchain vendors, namely, Ethereum and
IBM Blockchain. In Section 6, we analyze the results of the integration of the LCaaS model with Ethereum
and IBM Blockchain. In Section 7, we discuss practical aspects of implementing LCaaS. In Section 8, we
summarize potential threats to the validity of the proposed solution. Finally, in Section 9, we conclude the
paper by providing a summary and a direction towards future work.
2 Literature Review
In Section 2.1, we review the related work that highlights the importance of Cloud monitoring and challenges
specific to Cloud monitoring. In Section 2.2, we provide an overview of blockchain and its characteristics,
concluding with a review of blockchain capacity limitations and their respective solutions.
2.1 Cloud Logs and Related Challenges
Companies like Netflix deploy large and scalable solutions on the Cloud. The metrics that need to be
monitored can quickly produce more than 10 billion records a day [16], making the data set large enough to
be classified as Big Data [17, 18]. The high volume of generated logs makes the storage and process of the
collected data computationally expensive [18, 19]. Hence, monitoring large scale deployed platforms is one
of the major challenges of Cloud monitoring [19].
In addition to the scale of generated logs, unique characteristics of Cloud platforms cause various moni-
toring challenges. The CSPs use Cloud orchestration tools to automate the allocation of resources and their
placement, fault management, and storage management [20]. Many monitoring tools need to be aware of the
existence of a resource before they can provide a monitoring service for it. Hence, conventional monitoring
tools cannot be used in an environment that offers dynamic resource allocation [19] empowered by Cloud
orchestration tools. These challenges are not limited to hardware resources such as CPU and RAM, and the
dynamic nature of Cloud networks also causes difficulties for the network monitoring tools [21].
Cloud platforms consist of several hierarchical layers [22]. The layer at the bottom is the hardware
level and consists of data centre components. Many software-defined layers are implemented on top of this
layer [23]. A common challenge for CSPs is to trace an issue and find out the layer (and a component
specific to that layer) that is the root cause of a given problem. Addressing this challenge requires extensive
traceability and a holistic view of how layers are interrelated. Interestingly, this layered architecture opens
the door for many log tampering opportunities as the logs at each layer are only accessible to the technical
team responsible for that layer.
The legal system relies on a range of forensic investigation and identification. In the digital era, digital
evidence such as operational logs, transaction logs, and usage logs replace physical evidence. This new type
of evidence requires new forensic investigation methods [24]. In an attempt to regulate and standardize
digital forensics practices, the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) [25] has developed a forensic
framework. The framework identifies preservation as a crucial step and indicates that it must be a guarded
principle across “forensic” categories.
Another major challenge related to the authenticity and reliability of digital evidence is that digital
data are much more easily tampered with compared to physical evidence. Furthermore, just transferring or
viewing digital evidence requires translation and transformation through many software and network layers.
As a result, a significant trust issue exists for any digital evidence that is captured from a digital source. To
effectively use logs as digital evidence, many have recommended using a Log Management System (LMS)
[26, 27]. The majority of LMSs promise a set of desirable features, such as tamper-resistance, verifiability,
confidentiality, and privacy [27]. To secure the collected logs, specifically audit logs, Waters et al. [11] build
a platform that uses hash encryption to protect the content of audit logs from unauthorized parties by
encrypting the content of them. Furthermore, the authors indicate that while encryption is required to
preserve the logs and to make them immutable, it will cause many search issues. For instance, relying on
traditional search techniques would require complete decryption for all the records at the search time. Such
a requirement by itself creates room for potential unauthorized access. The authors present a design for a
log encryption system that allows a designated trusted party, known as an audit escrow agent, to construct
search capabilities and allow an investigator to decrypt entries matching a keyword. Ko and Will [28]
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indicate that data are (arguably) the most important asset on the Cloud and offer a solution (referred to as
Logger) to address four issues of the current data collection tools: the inability to provide a tamper-resistant
environment, accurate timestamp synchronization among all data collection servers, log space requirements,
and efficient logging of root usage of the system. Ko and Will [28] offer a solution referred to as Logger and
claim that Logger addresses all four issues. Regarding preventing log tampering, the authors acknowledge
the complexity and difficulty of this requirement and address it by only allowing an internal process to access
the file and forcing such limitation in all internal system calls. The authors explore additional options, such
as the use of signatures, hash creation for records, or hash chaining, but in the end, argue that such methods
can cause significant performance issues. However, LMSs are managed by IT personnel; thus, requiring the
presence of a trusted third party (TTP), limiting LMSs applicability.
File verification techniques can be utilized to preserve log integrity. More than five decades ago, Peterson
et al. described the use of cyclic codes to verify that a given array of bits is original or a change has
happened [29]. Based on similar principles of cyclic codes, checksum has been widely known and used
[30, 31]. In particular, checksums are used by many file systems to validate the integrity of files and
their related operations, such as copy and move. The primary issue related to checksumming data is that
generating and verifying checksum values will slow down the I/O process [31], which is known to be the
slowest among all processes in a computer [32].
One of the most popular modern hashing techniques is a family of Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) [33],
which is used as a means to verify content, authorship, or a property of a digital artifact. As an example, the
source code management system git [34] generates a SHA-1 [33] signature for a commit and uses it to trace
the commit throughout the entire lifecycle of the source code [35]. In this solution, SHA-1 is mainly used
for traceability and points out to the person who committed the code and is not used for tamper-detection.
In recent years, many verification-as-a-service platforms offer integrity control for the data that are
uploaded by the user, but they do need a TTP. For example, arXiv [36] provides a repository for electronic
documents and ensures their integrity.
As for Cloud solutions, theoretically, many of the mentioned solutions are applicable. However, the
complexity of the Cloud environment and the scale of generated logs bring more challenges for the storage,
access, and verification of the logs. Sharma [37] points out the complexity of a mega-scale Cloud environment
and suggests incorporation of various cryptographic algorithms and digital signature to achieve high integrity
for storing critical information in the Cloud. Liu et al. [38] focus on the data storage integrity verification
for Big Data in the areas of Cloud and Internet of Things (IoT), stating that data integrity is critical for
any computation-related system.
The problem of trusting a third-party can be alleviated by a self-contained solution that does not rely
on a TTP integrity verification service. We argue that blockchain is among the most promising solutions
that can be used to replace the requirement for a TTP. It was initially designed to support a cryptocurrency
known as Bitcoin that does not require a TTP (such as banks or other financial institutes) for verification
or maintenance of financial transactions. A correctly implemented distributed blockchain is an adequate
alternative to address the TTP issue [39, 40].
2.2 Blockchain
Blockchain, in the simplest form, is a distributed database of records. Records are stored in each copy of the
database, known as a public ledger, and they are append-only. The most famous application of blockchain
is providing the infrastructure to the most controversial currency in the world, i.e., Bitcoin. While Bitcoin
is tightly coupled with the blockchain, it is important to mention that Bitcoin is only one of the possible
applications of blockchain technologies.
In 2008, an individual or a group of the researcher(s) under the alias of Satoshi Nakamoto published a
paper titled “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system” [41]. In this paper, the author(s) describe a
system in which financial transactions can be sent from a sender to a recipient without relying on a trusted
financial institute such as a bank. Nakamoto argue(s) that a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash
transaction eliminates the needs of relying on a financial institution. A payer needs to digitally sign a
transaction to prove the authenticity of the transaction, and the receiver has to verify the transaction to
prevent the double-spending problem. A significant component that allows transactions to be immutable is
the use of a timestamp method to mark each transaction with a timestamp. A timestamp server takes a
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hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishes the hash and its timestamp so that every
participant gets to know that the items must have existed at the time of the announcement [41].
A significant component of blockchain that allows transactions to be immutable is the use of the Proof of
Work (PoW) verification schema. PoW involves running iterations for finding a particular value that, when
it is hashed in conjunction with other elements of a block, the calculated hash begins with a certain number
of zero bits. The number of zeros is proportional to the time required to complete a PoW. The higher the
number of zeros, the longer it will take to complete the PoW. Once the computational effort is dedicated
and the hash value is found, all items along with the found value, known as nonce, are kept in a block. The
content of a block cannot be changed unless the whole PoW process is repeated. Chaining blocks together
using hash binding or hash chaining [42, 43, 10] significantly increases the amount of computational effort
that is needed for changing the content of an earlier block. In a hash binding relationship, the current hash
of the previous block is used as the previous hash of the current block. This chain makes any attempt to
change the blockchain computationally unfeasible as one needs to re-process PoW for all the blocks in order
to tamper with any of the earlier blocks [44].
Current blockchain implementations of the distributed ledgers already have notary proof-of-existence
services [39]. For example, Poex.io [45], launched in 2013, verifies the existence of a computer file at a specific
time, by storing a timestamp and the SHA-256 [33] of the respective file in a block that eventually will be
added to a blockchain. The service is anonymous as the files are not stored or transferred to the provider’s
servers. Since the digital signature of the file is permanently stored in a decentralized blockchain, the provider
can verify the integrity and existence of such a file (at a point of submission to the blockchain) anytime in
the future. Characteristics of cryptographic hash function [46] allow a provider to claim, with high certainty,
that if the document had not existed at the time when its hash was added to the blockchain, it would have
been very difficult to embed its hash in the blockchain after the fact. Additionally, embedding a particular
hash and then adopting a future document to match the embedded hash is also almost impossible [46].
Proof-of-existence solutions cannot be used as scalable LMSs, as they consider files individually, with no
search function to locate the appropriate file or block. Moreover, Cloud solutions consist of thousands of
components, each of which generates a large volume of logs [47]. The current solutions are not designed to
handle the scale that is required to store Cloud-generated logs. Furthermore, the current public blockchains
can handle a limited number of concurrent transactions [39].
At its very core, blockchain requires a lot of computational resources to operate. For the creation of
every block, on average, many iterations of hash generation are repeated until the desired outcome matches
the required difficulty target. This requirement makes blockchain an expensive solution for the storage of
high volume data such as logs. Hence, using blockchain as a log management system, at least without
modifications, is neither financially nor technically feasible.
Accorsi [48] presents a digital black box solution, named BBox, that provides authentic archiving in
distributed systems. BBox offers a source validation technique and only allows authorized devices to insert
records in the log files. Further, BBox uses hash chains to encrypt all data, and there are no logs stored as
clear-text. Last but not least, BBox offers a keyword-based retrieval of records.
Although records are encrypted, BBox supports simple keyword searches for log entries, by generating
the so-called log views”. Therefore, the retrieval only requires the decryption of logs that match the entered
keyword and, in return, reduces the cost of log view generation.
The use of blockchain technology is not limited to the financial industry. Azaria et al. [49] denote that
heavy regulations and bureaucratic inefficiency have severely slowed the innovation for Electronic Medical
Record (EMR). The authors propose a blockchain-based solution, known as MedRec, which offers each pa-
tient easy access to their immutable medical records. Relying on key features of the blockchain, MedRec
manages all crucial considerations that are required when dealing with sensitive data sets such as healthcare
records. MedRec overcomes many inefficiencies that current EMRs have by employing advanced blockchain
techniques such as smart contracts [50]. The smart contract was invented by Szabo [50] to allow the decen-
tralized nodes to run self-executing autonomous pieces of code.
Although blockchain technology has great potential and can be used in many disciplines, it is dealing
with a number of challenges. The scalability remains the most critical challenge [51]. Blockchain heavily
relies on consensus algorithms, like PoW, and such algorithms are computationally expensive. To overcome
the scalability issues, a novel cryptocurrency scheme is suggested by [52] where old transactions are removed
from the blockchain, and a database holds the values of removed transactions. Although this solution reduces
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the size of the blockchain, it introduces the same trust issue that traditional databases are suffering from.
In [53], Eyal et al. suggest redesigning the current structure of a blockchain. In the redesigned model,
known as Bitcoin-NG (next generation), conventional blocks are decoupled into two parts: the key block
and microblocks. The key block is used for leader election, and the leader is responsible for microblock
generation until a new leader appears. Once a node generates a key block, it becomes a leader and is allowed
to generated microblocks. A microblock contains ledger entries and also a header that includes the reference
to the previous block. Peculiarly, microblocks do not require PoW and only key blocks contribute to the
length of the chain. While this approach is very different from current practices of the blockchain, the
authors claim that Bitcoin-NG maintains all security features of the blockchain.
PoW requires a lot of computing resources and a higher cost for creating each block. To address the cost
associated with PoW, King and Nadal [54] provide an alternative approach to PoW and name it Proof-of-
Stake (PoS). They argue that the security of peer-to-peer cryptocurrency solutions (such as Bitcoin) do not
have to depend on the cost of energy consumption, and one can mine or validate block transactions according
to how many coins he or she holds. Compared to PoW, the proposed alternative works faster and cheaper.
Confirming the ownership of a coin (or any digital asset) is fast, easy and secure. Given the higher efficiency
of PoS, some public blockchain platforms such as Ethereum have decided to migrate from PoW to PoS. At
the time of writing this paper, the migration is in progress and is expected to be completed by the end of
2021 [55]. Currently, Ethereum runs on a hybrid PoW / PoS structure [56]. The PoS schemas are actively
evolving. For example, Micali et al. [57] create a fast, scalable, and secure PoS algorithm, called Algorand.
The authors prove optimality of their solution and are currently working on the production implementation
of the algorithm [58].
3 Background
We introduce some basic components and characteristics of blockchains in this section. In Section 3.1, we
present a brief overview of common components of all blockchains and describe what each component does.
In Section 3.2, we provide an overview of the mining and immutability of blocks in a blockchain.
3.1 Common Key Components of Blockchains
Here, we introduce the components that are common among all implementations of the blockchain.
Genesis Block (GB): Genesis block is the first block of any blockchain. Genesis block has predefined
characteristics. Its index and previous hash are set to zero, as there are no prior blocks. The primary
purpose of a genesis block is to indicate the start of a new blockchain [59].
Data Block (DB): A data block, more commonly known as a block, contains the following variables: index,
timestamp, data, current hash, and previous hash. The first element, index, is a unique sequential ID for
each block; it uniquely identifies each block. The timestamp indicates the time at which the block is created
and is usually stored in the Coordinated Universal Time format. The data is the most important element
of a data block. It contains valuable information that blockchain has promised to be immutable. The nonce
is an arbitrary random number that is used to generate a specific current hash. To achieve hash binding,
each block includes a previous hash element. The previous hash is the exact duplicate of the current hash of
the previous block. In other words, the current hash of the m-th block becomes the previous hash of block
m+ 1. We use SHA-256 to generate current hash and nonce for a block as illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Blockchain (BC): Blocks that are linked together via hash binding will result in a blockchain. If data in
an earlier block (say, block m) are tampered, the link among all the subsequent blocks, from m + 1 to the
most recent block i will be broken. Then one has to recompute current hash and nonce values of each block
from block m to block i of the BC.
3.2 Mining and Hash Binding
Relying on key characteristics of cryptographic hash function [46], blocks are cryptographically sealed and
mined. Mining is the process running through all possible values of an integer variable1, known as nonce, to
1Typically implemented as an unsigned integer.
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Algorithm 1: Generation of current hash and nonce for a block.
Input : block index, timestamp, data, previous hash
Output: current hash, nonce
1 content = concatenate(index, timestamp, data, previous hash);
2 content = Hasher(content); // to speedup computing
3 nonce = 0;
4 repeat
5 nonce = nonce + 1;
6 current hash = Hasher( concatenate(nonce, content) );
7 until prefix of current hash = difficulty target ;
8 return current hash, nonce;
find a value for nonce, such that if the value is added to the rest of elements of a block and then hashed, the
hash matches the imposed difficulty target. Once the desired value for nonce is found, it resides in the nonce
element of the block, and the calculated hash resides in the current hash element of a block. At this stage,
the block is mined. The difficulty target is often defined as the number of required zeros at the beginning of
the desired hash. The more zeros, the more computational power is needed to generate a hash that matches
the difficulty target. Blocks are linked together based on a hash binding relationship.
Once a block is mined, its content can no longer change unless the whole PoW process is repeated for every
block in the blockchain. In addition to hash binding, blockchains take advantage of the hash function basic
properties, namely first and second preimage resistance and collision resistance, which make it extremely
difficult to tamper with the hash values (ensuring their uniqueness), see [60] for details.
In addition to hash binding, blockchains take advantage of the hash function properties. Most cryp-
tographic hash functions are designed to take an input of any size and produce a fixed-length hash value.
Menezes et al. [60] indicate the following three basic properties of a hash function h with inputs x or x′ and
outputs y or y′.
1. “Preimage Resistance: for all predefined outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input
which hashes to that output, i.e., to find any preimage x′ such that h(x′) = y for any y for which
a corresponding input is not known. In other words, for a given hash, it would be computationally
unfeasible to reverse the hash function and find the value that was hashed.” [60]
2. “Second preimage resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any second input which has
the same output as any specified input, i.e, given x, to find a second preimage x′ 6= x such that
h(x) = h(x′).” [60]
3. “Collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x and x′ which
hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x) = h(x′). Collision resistance implies second preimage
resistance but does not guarantee preimage resistance.” [60]
3.3 Blockchain Taxonomies
Here we provide a summary of different types of blockchains and how they are compared. We will start by
looking at the deployment models, including private and public blockchain and then move to the adminis-
trative models, including permissioned and permission-less blockchains.
3.3.1 Private and Public Blockchains
Blockchains, as tamper-evident and tamper-resistant distributed digital ledgers, can be deployed in various
ways. They can be implemented privately, inside an organization, or can be launched publicly for a wider
range of customers. Regardless of their implementation location, blockchains have the same fundamental
components, which were discussed in Section 3.1.
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Table 1: Differences between Private and Public blockchains
Public Private
Network Decentralized Centralized
Security Open Network Approved Participants
Access Permission-less Permissioned
Identity Anonymous or Pseudonymous Known Identities
Speed Slower Faster
In a private blockchain, nodes who can participate are often part of the same organization that controls
the centralized network and offer permissions to various players. In public blockchains, since they are open to
the public, all records are visible to everyone, and the network is open for new nodes to join and participate.
In recent years, consortium blockchains have evolved as a hybrid model based on public blockchains. A
consortium blockchain is very similar to a public blockchain except that only a group of pre-selected nodes
would participate in the consensus process of the blockchain [61]. Table 1 lists the differences between private
and public blockchains.
3.3.2 Permissioned and Permission-less Blockchains
As highlighted in NIST’s Blockchain Technology Overview [62], blockchain implementations are often inspired
by a specific purpose or function. The purpose plays a significant role in finding and adopting the right
model of blockchain. Blockchains have been categorized into two high-level categories: permission-less and
permissioned (also known as permission-based). The permissionless blockchain allows any arbitrary user to
interact with the blockchain and read and write blocks without the need of a central authority or getting
approval from any party. In contrast, permission-based blockchains limit participants to specific people or
organizations and provide a systematic authentication and authorization approach.
4 Design of LCaaS
In this section, we introduce the methodologies that we use to build Logchain and explore the implementation
of the hierarchical ledger. Furthermore, we introduce Logchain API, its signatures, and its responses. In
Section 4.1, we give a general overview of Logchain as a service, its details, and the additional components
that are added to the blockchain to enhance LCaaS’ scalability. In Section 4.2, we review LCaaS API, its
signatures and methods.
4.1 Logchain as a Service (LCaaS)
Current blockchain consensus protocols require every node of the network to process every block of the
blockchain, hence a major scalability limitation. We overcome this limitation by segmenting a portion of a
blockchain and locking-it-down in a block of a higher level blockchain, i.e., we create a two-level hierarchy
of blockchains. Validating the integrity of a high-level block confirms the integrity of all the blocks of the
lower-level blockchain and leads to a reduction of the number of operations needed to validate the chain. The
LCaaS is a hierarchical blockchain framework, graphically shown in Figure 1 depicts a two-level hierarchy,
but the number of levels can be increased if a use case requires it, making it a cascading blockchain.
As mentioned in the legend of Figure 1, ni refers to the number of data blocks in the i-th circled blockchain
and αj is the index of the terminal block of the j-th circled blockchain. βj is the index for the absolute or
relative genesis block of the j-th circled blockchain. The value of αj will be calculated by
αj =
{
n0 + 1, if j = 0
n0 + 1 +
∑j
i=1 (ni + 2)ni, if j ≥ 1
(1)
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Figure 1: Two-level Hierarchy as implemented by LCaaS
and the value of βj will be calculated by
βj =
{
0, if j = 0
αj−1 + 1, if j ≥ 1
. (2)
Logchain resides on top of a basic blockchain and converts it to a hierarchical ledger. Our primary goal is
to bring scalability to blockchain for the situations in which the number of data items stored in a blockchain
is large (e.g., operational logs of a Cloud platform).
As the name implies, the LCaaS offers the hierarchical ledger as a service. Cloud participants can create
an account and receive a unique API key for all corresponding API calls. Clients also need to configure two
main settings on their instance before they can use it. The first key configuration is the difficulty target,
which is defined as the number of required zeros at the beginning of an acceptable hash. The LCaaS will
continue to generate new hashes and new nonces until a hash is generated that matches the difficulty target.
The second key configuration is defining a limit for the number of blocks in a circled blockchain. This
constraint acts as a size-limit and controls how many blocks are accepted in each circled blockchain. Once
the limit is reached, the LCaaS takes the blockchain and pushes it to the hierarchical ledger. Let us now
look at the key components of the LCaaS.
While common key components of blockchains are necessary to implement a blockchain, our prototype
requires additional components. We have expanded the basic genesis block concept and introduced absolute
genesis block, relative genesis block, terminal block, super block, and super blockchains. These advancements
allow the LCaaS to provide the hierarchical structure that improves the scalability of blockchains.
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Absolute Genesis Block (AGB): Absolute genesis block is placed as the first block of the first circled
blockchain. An AGB is the first block that is created in the LCaaS and has the same characteristics as GB,
with index and previous hash set to zero and the data element set to null.
Relative Genesis Block (RGB): Relative genesis block is placed at the beginning of every subsequent
circled blockchain after the first circled blockchain. The previous hash of an RGB is set to the current hash
of the terminal block of the previous circled blockchain.
Terminal Blocks (TB): Terminal Blocks are similar to genesis blocks, but they are added at the end of a
blockchain to “close” it and produce a circled blockchain. The terminal block’s index and current hash are
calculated similarly to any other block. The part that differentiates a terminal block from a genesis block
or a data block is its data element. The terminal block’s data element stores a JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) object that contains details about the terminated circled blockchain. The details are as follows. The
aggr hash is created by collecting and hashing current hash values of all blocks in that circled blockchain,
from the AGB or RGB to the block before the terminal block. The data element also store four additional
values, namely timestamp from, timestamp to, block index from, and block index to.
Circled Blockchains (CB): Circled blockchains are blockchains that are capped. In other words, there is
a limit on the number of blocks that they can include before a terminal block “caps” the blocks. Once a
circled blockchain is terminated, it can not accept any new block.
Super Blocks (SB): Super blocks exhibit the features of regular data blocks and have nonce, index,
timestamp, data, previous hash, and current hash. The only difference between a super block and data block
is that super block’s data element stores all of the field of a terminal block of a circled blockchain. In order
to accept terminal block elements, the data element consists of a JSON object. The elements of this JSON
object are as follows: index, timestamp, data, current hash, previous hash, and nonce.
Super Blockchain (SBC): Super blockchain is a blockchain where each of its blocks is a super block.
The super blocks are “chained” together by hash binding. In other words, super blocks that are linked
together will result in a super blockchain. An i-th super block in a super blockchain relies on current hash
of its previous super block. If data in an earlier super block m is tampered with, the link among all the
subsequent super blocks, from m+1 to the most recent super block, denoted by super block i, will be broken.
Then one has to recompute current hash and nonce values of each super block from super block m to super
block i.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between a terminal block and all other blocks in a circled blockchain.
All elements of a super block are identical to the ones of a data block. Thus, it can be implemented by any
other blockchain framework.
Considering that a super block’s data element includes all the elements of a terminal block, changing any
block in a circled blockchain, not only breaks the circled blockchain but also breaks the super blockchain.
The data element of the super block provides a hash tree structure and enhances the immutability the circled
blockchains, while decreasing the computational resources required to verify blocks in a circled blockchain.
The above novel enhancements allow the LCaaS to provide the hierarchical structure that is needed to
overcome scalability limitations of the blockchains. In the following section, we dive into the implementation
details of the LCaaS.
4.2 LCaaS API
To simplify the interaction with the Logchain platform, we introduce an API that converts the Logchain to
the LCaaS. The CSPs can efficiently use this API and interconnect the LCaaS with their monitoring systems
and store all their logs, or the hash of their logs, in the Logchain. Similarly, CSCs can search and verify
provided logs against the data in the Logchain and, therefore, be assured that the logs provided by the CSPs
are not tampered with. However, the API is not provided to CSCs. In the current implementation, the
application receives logs or their hashes, adds them to the data blocks and mines the blocks by finding a
nonce. Like all other blockchains, our implementation links the blocks to their previous blocks by inserting
the current hash of the previous block into the previous hash of the current block.
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Figure 2: The Relation Between Terminal Block and All other Blocks in a Circled Blockchain
4.2.1 Submission Methods
The API is designed and implemented using Flask [63], a micro-framework for Python. There are two data
submission methods: submit raw and submit digest. The former allows the client to submit the actual logs,
while the latter — just the file’s digest (e.g., SHA-based digest computed using OpenSSL dgst [64]), thus,
preserving the privacy of the log and reducing the amount of transmitted data. Both methods return, on
success, timestamp, block index and other details of the created block and, on failure, details of the error.
For privacy reasons, the CSPs or CSCs may decide to generate a digest locally and submit it to LCaaS by
using the submit digest method. The Client of the LCaaS, have full control over the amount of log included
in each submission and their interval, Therefore, LCaaS API can be really customized based on the presented
scenario and the CSPs and CSCs needs.
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4.2.2 Verification Methods
There are three verification methods: verify raw, verify digest, and verify tb. The first one allows the client
to verify the existence of actual logs in the Logchain. The second one allows the client to verify the digest of
the logs. The last method allows a user to verify the existence of a terminal block with a specified hash in the
Logchain, hence, proving the integrity of all the blocks in the circled blockchain of the submitted terminal
block with one verification operation. All methods return, on success, the details of the found values in the
Logchain and, on failure, details of the error.
For the verification of the actual log content, one should use method verify raw. The method would
return the status of submission and number of blocks that match the submitted data; if no block is found,
the API will return a message informing the user that no match has been found. In case of an error, the
API will return the failed status along with the error’s description.
To improve the scalability of our solution, we introduce the verify tb method. It provides an assurance
(in the cryptographic sense [46]) that the sequence of blocks, from index from to index to are not tampered
with. By comparing the generated hash value from all the current hash values of a circled blockchain to
the aggr hash value in the data element of a TB, one can verify the integrity of all the blocks in the circled
blockchain.
It is important to mention that while we have introduced these additional components, we have tried
not to alter the key element of the actual blocks. Avoiding any alteration on block’s structure is intentional,
because any modification in the blocks format (e.g., adding new elements) will result in a proprietary imple-
mentation of blocks and blockchains and will reduce the applicability of the proposed hierarchical structure
to other existing blockchain platforms.
5 Validation Case Study
Here, we review the validation and evaluation of the LCaaS and its integration with the blockchain vendors.
Section 5.1 provides rationale for choosing Ethereum and IBM Blockchain. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 covers details
of integration with the Ethereum and IBM Blockchains, respectively. Section 5.4 discusses controlling factors
of Ethereum and IBM Blockchain integration. Finally, Section 5.5 depicts the workload drivers.
5.1 Integration Platforms - Rationale
5.1.1 Rationale for choosing Ethereum
While the focus of some public blockchains (such as Bitcoin and Litecoin) is on financial transactions,
other public blockchains such as Ethereum try to provide different applications and use cases for blockchain
technology. Coherently, Ethereum provides the developer with an end-to-end system for building various
distributed applications [65].
Ethereum provides a robust platform for designing and deploying smart contracts. The smart contracts
are autonomous pieces of code [50]. They are deployed over the blockchain and are stored in blocks. Upon
being called, like a function, smart contracts can interact with the user data or data stored in the blockchain.
Ethereum has developed Solidity [66], a high-level language for developers who want to build and deploy
smart contracts on Ethereum blockchain. Additionally, to make the programming of smart contracts simpler,
the Ethereum team has provided Remix [67]: an online/offline Integrated Development Environment (IDE)
for coding and compiling Solidity code.
Ethereum works based on the Ether currency. Ether is a necessary element for operating Ethereum and is
a form of payment made by the platform clients to the machines executing the requested operations (mainly
smart contracts). All financial transactions, such as incentives and transaction fees, are paid in Ether. Ether
also allows Ethereum to remain a healthy network as it encourages developers to write quality applications,
as the inefficient code will cost more to run [68].
Given the popularity of Ethereum, its wide range of use cases, and its widely available development tools,
we have selected Ethereum as the public blockchain platform for integration with the LCaaS.
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5.1.2 Rationale for choosing IBM Blockchain
Cloud-backed blockchain platforms such as IBM Blockchain try to provide a generalized platform for many
different applications and use cases. IBM Blockchain provides developers with an end-to-end platform for de-
signing, building, and implementing various applications based on the underlying blockchain technology [69].
Another major feature of IBM Blockchain is its extensive support for the smart contracts. Within the
IBM Blockchain, smart contracts are known as Chaincode [70]. To simplify the development process, IBM
Blockchain is equipped with an extension [71] for Visual Studio code(VSC) [72] that can be used for building
and deploying smart contract on the IBM Blockchain platform. The extension uses direct access to IBM
Blockchain (of course, after successful authentication) and can directly edit, run, and deploy smart contracts
on the IBM Blockchain. Smart contracts for IBM Blockchain can be developed in Java, JavaScript, and
Go [73].
Given the popularity of Cloud-based services, its wide range of use cases [69], we have selected IBM
Blockchain as the private blockchain platform for integration with the LCaaS.
5.2 Case study setup: Ethereum
Figure 3 depicts the relationship between LCaaS and Ethereum. The API module receives API calls from
clients and passes them to the Logchain Module. The Logchain module employs the Blockchain module
to convert the received data (digest or raw logs) to blocks and pushes a copy of the blocks to Firebase
and another copy to the API module. The API module pushes the received data to the Ethereum and
informs the client of the successful submission of data to the blockchain. We use Google Firebase real-time
database [74] to store all types of blocks as additional permanent storage. Integration with the Firebase can
be disabled without affecting the normal operation of the LCaaS.
LCaaS is built on top of a private blockchain. In order to replace it with a public blockchain (e.g.,
Ethereum), integration points have to be designed. We propose a composite structure, in which receiving
logs and converting them to blocks happens at the LCaaS side and storing the hashes and digitally signing
them happens over the Ethereum blockchain. Using blockchain terminology, data collection and blockification
of logs happen off-chain, and the block storage on the Ethereum blockchain is handled by Ethereum smart
contract and will be on-chain.
Within the Ethereum blockchain, economics is controlled by an execution fee called gas. The gas is paid
by Ether—the Ethereum intrinsic currency [65]. Gas measures, in computation resource terms, the effort
that is needed to process the transaction. A smart contract consists of one or more operations, and each
operation has an associated gas cost, which is defined by the Ethereum protocol [75]. For instance, a SHA-3
operation costs 30 units of gas. The higher the gas price, the more appealing the transaction would become
for the miners. Hence, if a transaction needs to be executed faster, the higher gas price will motivate a miner
to consider the transaction and mine it in the upcoming block. The current implementation of LCaaS does
not use a lot of computational resources for each block that is pushed to the blockchain; thus, the main
bottleneck is at the blockchain provider side. As indicated above, one can increase the performance of the
blockchain by increasing the gas price for the desired transaction.
In the light of the above economics and the fact that each transaction incurs a cost, we limited the
submissions to the Ethereum blockchain to super blocks. Super blocks include complete elements of a
terminal block of a circled blockchain and can be used to verify the integrity of all the blocks in that circled
blockchain. Based on the preimage resistance property of hash functions (mentioned in Section 3.2), it
would be computationally infeasible to construct an entire circled blockchain such that its hash matches the
current hash of a super block. However, if one desires, minor changes to the current implementation of the
Ethereum module can be made to allow the LCaaS to push data blocks to the Ethereum blockchain as well.
Since the main Ethereum blockchain is used for production and real transactions, pushing data and
smart contracts to this network requires actual payments. To allow developers to test and interact with the
Ethereum blockchain, Ethereum has provided a real, live, and decentralized test blockchain that can be used
throughout the entire development lifecycle and can be easily replaced by the real blockchain network when
the developer decides to do so. There are two options to take advantage of the Ethereum test network [76].
The first alternative, known as local, allows one to set up a node locally on a personal computer or a hosted
server and run an isolated node which simulates nodes on the public Ethereum blockchain. The second
alternative, known as public, uses a decentralized test network that all developers worldwide are constantly
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Figure 3: LCaaS and Ethereum integration
using. This live test network is more similar to the real Ethereum blockchain as it is a publicly available
decentralized blockchain. Because we need to use a test network that resembles all characteristics of the
real Ethereum blockchain, we chose the second alternative to test drive the integration of the LCaaS and
Ethereum.
Considering the cost of mining and adding a transaction to a block, public blockchain platforms offer
their services at a price. Customers, who are willing to interact with the public blockchain, should pay
the required fee for every transaction. Interestingly, Ethereum test networks follow the same logic. In fact,
any interaction other than submitting a query against the test network requires payment in Ether currency.
However, a special type of Ether is designed for transactions on Ethereum test networks. Known as test
Ether, the currency does not have any real monetary value, yet, it resembles the real Ether on the live
Ethereum blockchain. To obtain test Ether, we use MetaMask Ether Faucet [77].
Smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain allow users to interact with the blockchain. In other words,
any interaction with the blockchain has to be managed by published smart contracts. The storage of super
blocks in the blockchain requires a smart contract. It is important to mention that a super block’s data
element contains the terminal block of a circled blockchain. Hence, super block is the most efficient candidate
to be stored in a public blockchain, as one can easily verify the integrity of a super block and conclude the
integrity of all the blocks in the circled blockchain that the terminal block (stored in that super block) has
terminated.
To publish our smart contract, we use Solidity [66], as it is the recommended language for developers to
build and deploy smart contracts on Ethereum blockchain. Furthermore, we use Remix [67] as an IDE for
coding and compiling the solidity code. The smart contract implements the logic of receiving super blocks
and pushing them into the Ethereum blockchain. We name this smart contract Superblock.sol (available
at [13]).
Once the smart contract is developed, it has to be published on the Ethereum blockchain. We use
the Remix to publish the smart contract. Publishing a smart contract on the blockchain is considered a
transaction and is a chargeable service. Thus, we use the test Ether that we have stored in MetaMask vault
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to pay the transaction fee.
The LCaaS platform is a pay-as-you-go platform with a flat membership fee. Hence, the premium
features such as integration with Ethereum are only available to users who pay the premium membership
fee. Therefore, we introduce additional logic in the smart contract to only accept transactions from users
who have paid their membership fee. Once the user’s address is added to the allowed list, they can push
super blocks into the published smart contract. The published smart contract stores the super blocks on the
Ethereum blockchain and, upon successful submission, returns a receipt back to the Ethereum module. The
receipt includes details of the transaction, such as the sender address, the content, the transaction hash, and
the block number.
All interactions with the Ethereum blockchain can be traced using Etherscan [78], a web dashboard
connected to Ethereum blockchain. Known as Ethereum block explorer, Etherscan allows anyone to look up
transactions’ details by using the sender or recipient address, transaction hash, or block number.
Using the Ethereum blockNumber field or the sender address, one can verify the transaction. If the
transaction is found and the submitted super block chain matches with the one at hand, the integrity of the
terminal block in the data element of the super block is confirmed; thus, confirming the integrity of all blocks
in the circled blockchain that the terminal block has terminated. An example of a successful transaction of
LCaaS on Etherscan can be seen in [79].
Figure 4 shows a successful submission of a super block to the Ethereum network.
Figure 4: Example of Super Block submission to Ethereum blockchain
5.3 Case study setup: IBM Blockchain
The relationship between LCaaS and IBM Blockchain is depicted in Figure 5.
The process of receiving data, processing it, and converting it to blocks remain the same as the processes
explained in Section 5.2 except that data are pushed to IBM Blockchain instead of Ethereum.
The integration between LCaaS and IBM Blockchain is achieved by defining an integration points between
these two independent platforms. In this composite integration structure, receiving logs and converting them
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to blocks happens at the LCaaS side and storing the hashes and digitally signing them happens over the
IBM Blockchain.
Unlike Ethereum, there is no concept of gas price on IBM Blockchain. However, the economics are
controlled, on hourly bases, and based on virtual processor core (VPC) allocation. This simplified model is
based on the amount of CPU (or VPC) that the IBM Blockchain Platform nodes are allocated on an hourly
basis. To further clarify the concept of VPC, is important to mention that a VPC is a unit of measurement
that is used to determine the licensing cost of IBM products and is based on the number of virtual cores
(vCPUs) that are available to the product. A vCPU is a virtual core that is assigned to a virtual machine
or a physical processor core. Within the IBM Blockchain platform, the platform cost estimation for 1 VPC
= 1 CPU = 1 vCPU = 1 Core [80].
There are some benefits of using this pricing model for IBM Blockchain. To begin with, it resembles
Cloud pricing mode, namely hourly, pay-as-you-go model. Additionally, it brings clarity to estimations and
as there is no minimum-investment requirement, developers and early adopters can try out the platform
Given that this is a paid service where each transaction incurs a cost, we limited the submissions to the
IBM Blockchain to super blocks as they include complete elements of a terminal block of a circled blockchain
and can be used to verify the integrity of all the blocks in that circled blockchain. Figure 5 depicts the
relationship between LCaaS and IBM Blockchain.
Figure 5: LCaaS and IBM Blockchain integration
The IBM Blockchain is a paid-service, and can be deployed on the IBM Cloud [81] as a service. We create
an account on the IBM Cloud and follow the guidelines listed on the IBM Blockchain developer support
website [82] to deploy and configure an instance of the IBM Blockchain. The latest version of VSC was
downloaded and the IBM Blockchain add-on for the VSC was installed. As reviewed in Section 5.1.1, smart
contracts allow external actors to interact with a blockchain. In the case of IBM Blockchain, smart contracts,
known as chaincodes, are used for the same purpose. The IBM Blockchain uses Hyperledger fabric [83] as its
blockchain framework and work based on the open source tools hosted by the Linux Foundation [84]. Thus,
we created a local development/deployment environment similar to the IBM Blockchain by instantiating a
local version of the Hyperledger fabric blockchain. Once the smart contract code was up and running, we
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ported it to the IBM Blockchain.
In this work, to develop smart contracts, our first attempt was to implement them using Python; however,
the Hyperledger Python SDK [85] was not ready at the time of this experiment; hence, we chose JavaScript
(running on the Node.js backend). The next step was to package the smart contract using the IBM Blockchain
Platform Extension for VSC and export it so it can be imported to the IBM Blockchain network.
The VSC IBM Blockchain extension allows direct interaction with the IBM Blockchain as long as a
private blockchain with credentials (permissioned) is set up, and its connection details are configured on the
VSC side. To instantiate an instance of The IBM Blockchain platform, one has to create a network [86] onto
an IBM Kubernetes [87]. After deploying the network, we created the required Membership Service Provider
(MSP) and a Certificate Authority(CA) for the private blockchain and associated them with a channel. Each
transaction on a network is executed on a channel that is a private sub-network of the main blockchain and
only allowed participants (known as organizations) can communicate and conduct transactions. Once the
channel is created, the developed chaincode is imported and associated with it. The deployed chaincode
constructs the business logic that receives data from LCaaS and submits it to the IBM Blockchain. At
this stage, the IBM Blockchain is configured, and there is a channel with authorized participants who can
submit data as blocks to the private instance of IBM Blockchain instantiated on the IBM Cloud. The only
remaining part for the end-to-end integration is a module that connects LCaaS to the instantiated instance
of IBM Blockchain as the private blockchain.
Many distributed blockchains, such as Ethereum and Bitcoin, are not permissioned, which means that
any node can participate in the consensus process, wherein transactions are ordered and bundled into blocks.
Because of this fact, these systems rely on probabilistic consensus algorithms which eventually guarantee
ledger consistency to a high degree of probability, but which are still vulnerable to divergent ledgers (also
known as a ledger fork), where different participants in the network have a different view of the accepted
order of transactions. As for the Hyperledger Fabric, the open source platform behind the IBM Blockchain,
things work differently. Hyperledger Fabric features a kind of a node called an orderer (its also known as an
ordering node) that does this transaction ordering, which along with other nodes forms an ordering service.
Because Fabrics design relies on deterministic consensus algorithms, any block a peer validates as generated
by the ordering service is guaranteed to be final and correct. Ledgers cannot fork the way they do in many
other distributed blockchains.
5.4 Test bench and control factors
5.4.1 Test bench
To test the performance of LCaaS and its integration with blockchain vendors, we designed a load test which
we run on our test computer with Intel i7-7500U CPU and 16 GB of RAM. The main goal of the load test
is to evaluate the impact of the configurable factors: incoming transactions per second and length of circled
blockchains.
For Ethereum, we use publicly available Ethereum test network (as was discussed in Section 5.2).
IBM Blockchain can be deployed in two different environments. The first, and preferred method is to
deploy it on the IBM Cloud while the second option is to install and configure it on-premises [88]. We
chose the Cloud deployment as it was the recommended deployment model. The default configuration of
computing resources of the IBM Blockchain [89] seem adequate for our test scenarios, but one can increase
the computing resources for a larger storage and/or a higher performance.
To be able to compare the results of submission of super blocks to Ethereum and IBM Blockchain, we
kept the rest of the configurations alike. Table 2 provides a summary of controlling factors and workload
drivers for Ethereum and IBM blockchain respectively. Below, we will provide the details of each of the
factors.
5.4.2 Common configurable factors
Incoming transactions per second (tps): The number of tps depends on the velocity of log generation at the
CSP side and the way that CSP decides to push their logs into LCaaS. The transaction in this case may
represent a log file. It is important to mention that the change in tps does not directly lead to a change of
frequency of submissions to the Ethereum blockchain. This is because LCaaS will store the received logs in
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Table 2: Configurable factors
Factor Values Note
Transactions per second (tps) [0.1, 1, 10, 100]
Length of circled blockchain (n) [1, 10, 100]
Gas price (g) measured in gwei (1 Ether = 109 gwei) [6, 9, 20] Specific to Ethereum integration
Number of sample log files 200 or 1000
Size of sample log files measured in bytes 64
difficulty target measured in bytes 000 prefix
blocks of a circled blockchain and then will push the generated super block to the Ethereum. By varying the
value of tps, we mimic workloads with different intensities, from the least intense at tps = 0.1 to the most
intense at tps = 100.
Length of circled blockchains (n): Circled blockchains store a genesis block, one or many data blocks,
and one terminal block. In other words, the number of data blocks in circled blockchains is configurable. A
larger number of data blocks in a circled blockchain will result in a lower frequency of submissions to the
Ethereum. Since each submission has a transaction fee, configuring a larger value for the number of data
blocks in a circled blockchain seems more feasible. While this is true, it brings an additional risk. The risk
is caused by the fact that LCaaS stores generated blocks internally and waits until the circled blockchain
is terminated before sending the respective super block to the Ethereum blockchain. Hence, transactions in
a longer circled blockchain are stored for a longer period, and this gives a longer window to an adversary
to tamper with the logs (we will further discuss this in Section 7.2). Therefore, by varying the value of n,
we mimic LCaaS handling from the most sensitive data (at n = 1) to the least sensitive one (at n = 100).
We submit the digest of a log file (64 bytes long) using submit digest function. Thus, the length of the file
is always constant. We did not measure the performance of submit raw in this series of experiments, but
we know that most of the time in this function is spent in computing the digest, which is proportional to
the length of the file. On our test computer, it takes 200 ms to compute SHA-256 digest for 1 MB file, 1.5
seconds — for 10MB file, and 15 seconds — for 100 MB file. The time to transfer the raw file from the user
to LCaaS will also be proportionate to the length of the file. However, if the internal network is fast, then
the transfer time will be small and can be ignored. Note that the time needed to process a super block is
independent of the length of a raw file, as we are dealing with digests of the files at that stage.
We set the difficulty target for internal computations to 000. To ensure that there are enough submissions
to Ethereum for each of the 36 experiments, for the setups with n ∈ [1, 10], we submit 200 digests representing
200 log files to the LCaaS; and for the setups with n = 100, we submit 1000 digests representing 1000 log
files to the LCaaS.
5.4.3 Ethereum-specific control factors
In addition to tps and n, Ethereum has gas price (g) as another controlling factor.
Gas price (g): The gas price is the amount paid per unit of gas and is defined by the initiator of the
transaction. The higher the gas price, the more appealing the transaction would become for the miners.
Hence, if a transaction needs to be executed faster, the higher gas price will motivate a miner to consider
the transaction and mine it in the upcoming block. The ETH Gas Station [90] keeps track of all submitted
transactions and their processing times and suggests a value of g for different processing speeds. For our
experiments, we tried setting g ∈ [6, 9, 20] gwei. These three values of g on September 10, 2018 corresponded
to processing times of less than 30, 5, and 2 minutes, respectively (based on [90]).
5.4.4 Test scenarios
Based on the configurable items and suggested values for gas price (as shown in Table 3), for Ethereum, we
designed 36 scenarios consist of combination of each one of the following possible values: tps = [0.1, 1, 10, 100],
n = [1, 10, 100], and g = [6, 9, 20].
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Table 3: Suggested gas prices as per [90], gathered on Sep. 10, 2018
Speed Gas price [gwei]
SafeLow (< 30 minutes) 6
Standard (< 5 minutes) 9
Fast (< 2 minutes) 20
Unlike Ethereum, IBM Blockchain does not have any currency or gas price, hence, we deal with a subset
of the controlling factors, namely, tps and n, leading to 12 distinct setups.
5.5 Workload Drivers
Since the LCaaS receives its incoming data through API, we use Postman [91] to generate incoming trans-
actions (i.e., log files) to the LCaaS. Using the Runner function of Postman, one can set the number of
iterations and delay for each submitted API calls. For example, the number of iterations set to 200 and the
delay of 1000 milliseconds will send 200 transactions to LCaaS at the rate of 1 tps.
6 Results
In Section 6.1, we discuss the performance of the the LCaaS itself, comparing the processing time for each
block type. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3, we discuss integration with Ethereum and IBM Blockchain, respectively.
6.1 LCaaS performance test analysis
LCaaS component, integrated with Ethereum and IBM Blockchain, is kept identical in both integration
scenarios (so that we can fairly assess the performance of each integration). That is, the number of trans-
actions, the length of circled blockchains, and the size of submitted logs to LCaaS are identical in both
integration scenarios. Therefore, the only difference between the two setups, from the LCaaS point of view,
is the blockchain vendor that is chosen as the endpoint for submissions of super blocks.
Internally, we track the time needed to create a block of each block type (discussed in Section 4.1). The
results of the timing for each block type are listed in Figure 6 and Table 4. As expected, by construction,
the creation of internal blocks on LCaaS (namely, AGB, DB, RGB, and TB) is much faster than of the SB,
which has to be submitted to blockchain vendors. Internal blocks creation time ranges2 between 10−6 and
0.38 seconds, while creation of the SB — from 10.17 seconds to 23 minutes for Ethereum and from 0.78 to
3.63 seconds for IBM Blockchain.
The time to create an internal block depends mainly on the difficulty target and the processing speed of
a computer on which the test is performed. This is why the processing times for all types of internal blocks
are similar. Moreover, eyeballing of Figure 6 suggests that the processing time of the AGB, DB, RGB, and
TB blocks remains similar, independent of the values of tps and n. This suggests that our test bed is capable
to absorb both low- and high-intensity workloads without reaching the saturation.
To create a super block, one needs to parse and fetch all of the field of a terminal block of a circled
blockchain and send it out to an external vendor, hence the additional processing time. Let us look at the
SB submission time in details.
6.2 Ethereum integration performance test analysis
We conduct 36 experiments (one for every permutation of the values of the factors listed in Table 2).
To see whether the performance will be affected by n, g and tps, we performed Pearson and Spearman
correlation analysis as well as linear regression analysis on the raw data (i.e., per SB timing), the mean,
the median, and the 95th percentile timing3 of SBs for each experiment. We found that none of the factors
2Technically, the 10−6 should be interpreted as ≤ 10−6, as 10−6 is the smallest duration that we could measure.
3Aggregate statistics are chosen to reduce the amount of noise in the data.
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Figure 6: Processing time of different types of blocks for different experiments. Columns portray differ-
ent values of tps, namely, 0.1, 1, 10, and 100. Rows show different gas prices in the case of Ethereum
LCaaS implementation (denoted ETH), namely, 6, 9, and 20, and no gas price in the case of IBM LCaaS
implementation (denoted IBM).
or the composite factors have any statistically significant relation to the response times, based on the low
(< 0.15) values of correlations and high (> 0.1) p-values of linear models. This implies that the time needed
to process SB block is dependent mainly on external factors, e.g., saturation of the Ethereum network and
availability of the miners.
We show a distribution of processing times for SB block in Figure 7. Eyeballing of the distributions
suggests that the lower the gas price is, the more SB blocks have higher processing time (> 32 seconds),
even though the difference is not dramatic. Based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the distribution of g = 20
case differs significantly (p-value < 0.001) from the cases when g = 9 or g = 6. However, the difference
between g = 6 and g = 9 cases is less pronounced: p-value ≈ 0.08. We were anticipating a stronger difference
between all three cases; probably our usage of the test network rather than a production one lead to this
anemic difference.
The Ethereum production network strives to keep the average processing time of a transaction at ≈
15 seconds [78]. As mentioned above, we observe an average of 23 seconds and the median of 20 seconds,
making it close to the target (even on the test network). Essentially, our findings show that the network has
enough capacity to “absorb” the changes in our workload even in the intense cases, such as tps = 100 and
n = 1. However, in rare cases, the processing time is high: out of 3089 processed SBs, 5 (0.16%) had been
processed in between 3 and 5 minutes, and 1 (0.03%) in 23 minutes. As we can see, these cases are rare,
but they do exist and we have to be aware of such events. From practical perspective, if LCaaS workload
deals with sensitive data, where the processing time is critical, one may setup an alerting mechanism that
will notify stakeholders of such events.
Can we extrapolate the results of test cases executed on the Ethereum test network to the production
one? Our tests show the overall feasibility of the approach: the smart contract required to submit an SB is
low enough (≈335K units of gas, as shown in Figure 4) to fit into an Ethereum block (i.e., it can be executed
on the production network). We also know that the production Ethereum network is scalable (currently
handling ≈1.2 million transactions per day [92]). Thus, adding hundreds or thousands of SB submissions
per day will not saturate the network.
The processing time is strongly driven by gas prices on the production network, as shown empirically
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Table 4: Summary statistics for processing time of different types of blocks. The columns of ‘1st qu.’ and
‘3rd qu.’ denote first and thirds quantiles, respectively. SB (ETH) and SB (IBM) denote super blocks
submitted to Ethereum and IBM Blockchain, respectively.
Block min 1st qu. median mean 3rd qu. max
AGB 1E-6 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06
DB 1E-6 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.38
RGB 1E-6 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.31
TB 1E-6 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.32
SB (ETH) 10.17 10.33 20.34 23.10 30.44 1353.37
SB (IBM) 0.78 1.62 2.72 2.28 2.79 3.63
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Figure 7: Density estimate of the processing time for SB block on Ethereum test network.
by [90]. We will further discuss gas prices and their effect on the cost of ownership in Section 7.4.2–onward.
6.3 IBM Blockchain integration performance test analysis
As the concept of gas price does not apply to the IBM Blockchain integration, our controlling factors and
their subsequent scenarios are limited to 12 experiments (one for every permutation of the values of the
factors listed in Table 2).
For each experiment, we have introduced submission timers for each block that is submitted to the IBM
Blockchain. To measure the most relevant timer, we have enabled this timer on the Hyperledger Node.js
component of the IBM Blockchain integration (see Figure 5).
As shown in Figure 6 and Table 4, the submission time of an SB ranges between 0.78 and 3.63 seconds.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that tps and n affect the duration of the submission time. However, from
practical perspective, their impact is minor as the submission time, even in the worst-case scenario is less
than 4 seconds.
For the IBM Blockchain, the main factor controlling the SB processing time is the performance of underly-
ing hardware running the IBM Blockchain. Furthermore, as IBM Blockchain is implemented over Kubernetes
containers, additional clustering configuration can be used to scale up the Blockchain platform performance,
if needed. The results published by the IBM Blockchain team show that the platform can handle 128 peers
and 325 channels using LevelDB ledger and achieve around 13K tps [93].
7 Discussion
In the previous section, we have analyzed the results of integration between LCaaS and two blockchain
vendors, namely, Ethereum and IBM Blockchain. We choose these two vendors on purpose as each one
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represents a different and vital type of blockchain. The private blockchains are designed for businesses that
want to employ blockchain technologies but without a publicly accessible ledger. While this can be an
applicable scenario for many businesses, many others, such as online asset tracking systems, need publicly
available ledgers, hence the public blockchains.
Which solution is the best? As usual, it depends on various aspects of a particular use-case. Below, we
will discuss these aspects. Specifically, implementation of the LCaaS part of our solution in production is
discussed in Section 7.1, security — in Section 7.2, timing — in Section 7.3, and the cost of ownership — in
Section 7.4.
7.1 Platform for CBs
We built a prototype implementing core elements (covering CBs) of the LCaaS [13] ourselves. However,
for the production implementations, we recommend that practitioners build their solution on top of the
enterprise-grade blockchain services, such as the IBM Blockchain that was used in this work, or similar
solutions, such as AWS Blockchain [94] and Azure Blockchain [95]. For the private implementation, one
can use one of the Hyperledger frameworks, such as Hyperledger Fabric [96], and build a hierarchical ledger
on top of it. Furthermore, public blockchain services, such as Ethereum, can be used but may not be
financially feasible for a large number of logs. Essentially, one will need to create a single blockchain for
Super blockchain and additional ones for each of the CBs. Note that a personal instance of the Ethereum
network can be deployed on the Cloud. For example, Microsoft Azure Cloud provides a template that can
create the infrastructure needed to deploy components needed for the creation of the network [97].
7.2 Security
7.2.1 Log submission intensity
How should we set a policy of submitting the logs to the Logchain? Two control variables at our disposal
are the time interval between submissions to the LCaaS and the maximum length (or the number of records)
that a log file has to reach before it gets submitted to LCaaS. Intuitively, we can say that if we submit a
log file to LCaaS every week, then it will give a perpetrator sufficient time to alter this log. Submitting
logs every second (or every time a new log record comes in) will mitigate this risk, but will probably be
economically infeasible and may also lead to scalability challenges.
What is the “goldilocks zone” then? The answer will depend on the nature of the logs. Log files with
sensitive information, such as security and audit logs (e.g., recording event of a user logging into a system)
may have to be submitted to LCaaS individually, i.e., a log file would contain a single log record. Typically,
the intensity of arrival of such events is low and will not overwhelm computational resources and budget.
Moreover, these are the types of records that an analyst may want to preserve as-is, without hashing them
(assuming this does not violate confidentiality). Log files with less sensitive information, e.g., the operational
logs containing performance metrics, can be submitted to the system every six hours (or sooner in case the
log gets full and is truncated and archived by an operating system, based on policies set by IT personnel).
In this case, four transactions per day will be submitted by a single logger, making archiving scalable and
budget-friendly. Note that these are the types of records that are good candidates for hashing rather than
storing in the raw format.
7.2.2 Public vs. private blockchain
The security of blockchain implementations is mainly dependent upon the security of underlying software
and hardware as well as the protocols and settings required for the blockchain to function [98].
A public blockchain is more decentralized, with a large number of participating nodes. In contrast, a
private blockchain is more centralized, and is designed to be used by one or more groups of users with a
common goal and inherently, a fairly smaller number of participating nodes. The number of participating
nodes, the consensus protocol in place, and the type of implementation play a significant role in security
aspects of blockchain-based solutions [99]
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7.3 Timing
As we can see from Figure 6 and Table 4, the processing of a transaction on average takes two seconds on
IBM Blockchain, while on the Ethereum network, it takes at least 23 seconds.
For IBM Blockchain, we are using the production network and thus can readily use these statistics.
However, in the case of Ethereum, we are using the test network. For a proper comparison, we need to assess
the time required to sign a transaction on the Ethereum blockchain.
The timing on the production network will depend on multiple factors, such as the number of miners
and the size of their computing resources, the intensity and the size of the transactions submitted to the
network. All of these factors are outside of our control.
The Ethereum production network strives to keep the average processing time of a transaction at ≈15
seconds [78]. We can treat it the lowest time limit to process and sign a block. In practice, the lowest threshold
is a bit higher, as a user needs to spend time to send the transaction to the pool of the transactions and
then distribute the transaction between the miners. Thus, signing an SB is faster on the IBM Blockchain
than on the Ethereum Network. Let us now look at the cost of ownership of these two solutions.
7.4 Cost of ownership
The costs associated with the creation and maintenance of the CBs will be the same, independent of the
solution that we build to sign the SBs. Let us examine the costs of signing the SBs below.
7.4.1 IBM Blockchain
In the case of the IBM Blockchain, we need to pay for the compute and storage resources required to process
the transactions. Let us use the reference architecture recommended by the manufacturer [100]. In this case,
the solution consists of the costs needed to run IBM Cloud Kubernetes cluster, IBM Blockchain Platform,
and IP address allocation, as well as compute and storage resources, costing us ≈$1.21 USD per hour. The
cost can be reduced to ≈$0.43 USD per hour by reducing computing resources. This reduction will be
applicable only if the intensity of SB submission is higher than 1 SB per hour (as the resources are billable
by the hour).
The cost per day will depend on the intensity of submissions of SBs and is shown in Figure 8 and
Table 5. The details of the computations are given in Appendix A.1. As expected, the more transactions
are submitted, the higher the cost (as we need a higher amount of computing resources): the daily cost of
ownership ranges from $11.14 USD to $29.09 USD for 1 transaction per day and per 5 minutes, respectively.
Table 5: Daily costs for submitting SBs in USD
Submissions IBM ETH ETH ETH ETH
per day slow average fast fastest
1 11.14 4.07 4.37 4.90 5.86
2 11.92 10.31 11.54 13.07 14.52
3 12.70 17.54 19.41 21.26 23.91
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
288 29.09 1597.05 1800.87 2000.94 2226.10
7.4.2 Ethereum Blockchain
In the case of Ethereum, SB submissions do not incur fixed cost. That is due to the fact that, unlike IBM
Blockchain, we do not need any specialized infrastructure for Ethereum. However, the cost will depend on
the number of transactions submitted (as we have to pay for every transaction) and the price of gas.
We know that the gas price, which a user sets, controls the speed with which a transaction is processed
by a miner (the higher the price is, the faster it is executed). However, how does the gas price change with
time? Let us explore the empirical data4 gathered from the Ethereum Gas Station service[90], shown in
4While ETH Gas Station predictions are not 100% accurate [101]; they are sufficient to illustrate the concept.
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Figure 8: Daily cost of ownership. The intensity ranges from 1 SB submission per day to 288 submissions
per day (i.e., one submission per five minutes).
Figure 9. The figure shows the price of gas a user needs to set to sign the transaction in less than 30 seconds
(fastest), 2 minutes (fast), 5 minutes (average), and 30 minutes (slow). The figure also shows that the faster
the transaction is, the more we have to pay. Our data analysis, based on the daily collection of data through
the exposed API by ETH GAS Station [102], also shows that that the prices exhibit daily seasonality and a
non-zero trend. We also see that the gas daily price is at the lowest at 23:50 UTC.
Figure 8 and Table 5 shows the daily costs of the SB submissions to the Ethereum blockchain. The details
of the computations are given in Appendix A.2. As we can see, the prices will increase with the growth of
the speed with which we would like the transaction to be processed, as well as the increase of intensity of
the SB submissions. The daily cost of ownership ranges from $4.07 USD for 1 transaction per day in the
slow scenario to $2226.10 USD for 1 transaction per 5 minutes in the fastest scenario.
7.4.3 IBM Blockchain vs. Ethereum blockchain
To reiterate, the cost of ownership will depend on the intensity of the submissions of SBs. When the intensity
is low, Ethereum is cheaper. When the intensity increases, IBM Blockchain becomes more economical.
Quantitatively, Ethereum blockchain will be more economical if the number of SB submissions per day will
be less than 2 (for the fast and fastest scenarios) and less than 3 (for the average and slow scenarios). These
thresholds may change in the future (as the underlying costs are non-constant). In contrast, the underlying
cost associated with running LCaaS and producing CBs is constant (the sum of computation cost for mining
and the cost for storing CBs).
Moreover, the IBM Blockchain can be used by multiple workloads. Thus, an organization may reduce
the cost per workload by sharing blockchain infrastructure.
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Figure 9: The price of gas required to sign the transaction on the production Ethereum blockchain under
a certain time limit, based on [90]. The data are gathered for a ≈37 days period between 2020-07-06 22:35
UTC and 2020-08-13 12:50 UTC. Legend: slow — less than 30 minutes are required to sign the transaction,
average — less than 5 minutes are needed to sign the transaction, fast — less than 2 minutes are required
to sign the transaction, and fastest — less than 30 seconds are required to sign the transaction.
Note that we do not consider the overhead associated with the maintenance of the IBM Blockchain
infrastructure. Also, the ETH–USD exchange rate is volatile (in the last 12 months it ranged between
≈$111 USD and ≈$400 USD for 1 ETH [103]), adding additional risks related to currency conversion.
To summarize, the pros and cons are as follows. Ethereum implementation is decentralized, has higher
redundancy, and a higher degree of trust (due to the large number of miners involved) than the IBM
Blockchain. However, its budget is less predictable (due to fluctuation in gas price and ETH–USD conversion
rate). Moreover, if the number of transactions is high, the Ethereum-based LCaaS may become prohibitively
expensive.
8 Threats to Validity
In this section, we discuss the threats that affect validity structured as per [104, 105].
Internal validity. Our integration of LCaaS with the blockchain vendors may be suboptimal and should
be treated as a proof of idea rather than production-grade integration. Nevertheless, we were able to achieve
strong performance results.
We conduct performance testing on the test Ethereum network rather than the production Ethereum
blockchain. The experiments on the test network show the computational feasibility of our approach (i.e.,
that a transaction with SB can be submitted to a block). To extrapolate the timing results to the production
network, we performed additional analysis based on the empirical data for gas prices and timing.
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In the case of the IBM Blockchain integration test, we have used the trial version of IBM Blockchain that
is running on the lite infrastructure with shared resources and declared limitations [106]. The performance
of the non-trial infrastructure may be higher due to more powerful resource allocation [89].
Construction validity. Manual gathering of performance data may lead to errors; thus, we automate
the execution and data gathering of the experiments to minimize the risk of human errors.
Statistical validity. We complete several statistical tests to analyze potential factors that affect the
performance of the LCaaS and its integration with blockchain vendors. The conclusions are drawn based on
the statistical validity of the tests.
External validity. It is important to mention that while we have introduced additional components
to LCaaS (namely AGB, RGB, TB, SB, and SBC), we have not altered the key elements of the actual
blocks, so that LCaaS can be easily integrated with any other blockchain, which is proven by the successful
integration of LCaaS to Ethereum and IBM Blockchain. With minor modifications, the proposed integration
architecture can be used for integration between LCaaS and any other blockchain networks that supports
smart contracts. Thus, LCaaS and its integration with Ethereum and IBM Blockchain can be treated as
“critical cases” (in a case study sense [105]) showing the feasibility of our approach.
An additional threat to the validity is that one could ask why the CSCs who do not fully trust CSPs,
would trust the logs provided by them? We argue that the tampering attempts typically happen after a client
complains about the service. If the time difference between the submission time of logs and the rendered
service is minimal, from milliseconds to a few seconds, the window of time at which the provider can tamper
with the logs is narrow.
9 Conclusion
We described Cloud-based immutable log storage solution, LCaaS, based on the blockchain technology. This
solution prevents log tampering, ensuring a transparent logging process and establishing trust between all
Cloud participants (providers and users). Thus, the solution is of interest to practitioners. We provided de-
tailed design of the solution and showed the implementation of the LCaaS on a public blockchain (Ethereum)
and a private blockchain (IBM Blockchain). Performance test suggests that the solution is scalable (dealing
with 100 tps) and is capable of fast “sealing” of the records (from seconds to minutes, depending on the
implementation). This work is also of interest to academics, as it describes building blocks, which may be
leveraged in a general scalable and immutable storage platform, leading to novel solutions for storing data.
The proposed LCaaS can act as a hierarchical ledger and a repository for all logs generated by Cloud
solutions and can be accessed by all Cloud participants (namely, providers and consumers) to establish trust
among them. Using verification services, a Cloud user can verify the Cloud provider’s logs against the records
in the hierarchical ledger and finds out if the logs were tampered with or not.
In the future, we are planning to test LCaaS with other existing blockchain solutions to find integration
points that can be used to implement LCaaS on top of such solutions. Additionally, we would like to
review the capacity and scalability challenges of blockchain and define key parameters that affect the LCaaS
performance and cost. At the final state, we would like to use such parameters to design a framework
that can reduce the total cost of ownership of an end-to-end solution for the secure storage of logs using
blockchains.
A Details of computing the cost of SB submission
Details of computing the cost of SB for IBM Blockchain are given in Appendix A.1, for Ethereum — in
Appendix A.2.
A.1 IBM Blockchain
A typical small-scale, production-grade setup of the IBM Blockchain costs $1.19 USD per hour [100]. The
recommended setup requires three VMs (two for the peers to ensure high availability, and one to act as
a Certificate Authority), an access to a production IBM Blockchain Platform, storage, and a Kubernetes
cluster (to tie it all together).
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To the variable costs above, we also need to add IP address allocation cost of $16.00 USD per month (or
≈ 16.00/30/24 = $0.02 USD per hour. This will increase hourly cost to ≈ $1.21 USD per hour.
When the system is inactive, we can scale down the CPU allocation to almost zero to reduce the cost [100].
In this case, the hourly price will be reduced to $0.43 USD per hour.
Assuming that we would like to equidistribute SB submissions around the clock-dial, we can take the
advantage of the cost reduction. The cost in this case will be computed as per Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Computation of daily cost for IBM Blockchain.
Input : s ; // SB count per day
Output: d ; // Daily cost in USD
1 c = 16.00/30/24 ; // IP address hourly cost
2 f = 1.19 + c ; // Full cost per hour
3 r ≈ 0.41 + c ; // Reduced cost per hour
4 if s < 24 then
5 d = s · f + (24− s) · r;
6 else
7 d = 24 · f ;
8 end
9 return d;
A.2 Ethereum Blockchain
We have gathered Ethereum gas prices every 5 minutes for 37 days. The results are shown in Figure 9.
These empirical data are passed to Algorithm 3 to compute daily price for a given scenario and SB
submission intensity. In a nutshell, the algorithm works as follows. Based on our analysis (example of
gas prices time series decomposition is shown in Figure 10), the lowest ETH gas price is, consistently,
at 23:50 UTC. Thus, this will be our starting time. Similar to the approach in Appendix A.1, we will
equidistribute SB submissions around the clock-dial. For example, if we need to submit one SB per day the
submission will happen at 23:50 UTC. In the case of two SB submissions, they will be sent off at 23:50 UTC
and 11:50 UTC, in the case of three SB submissions — at 23:50 UTC, 7:50 UTC, and 15:50 UTC, and so
on. For each scenario, we will then average out gas prices for a given minute of the day and sum them up.
To convert this value into US dollars, we will need to multiply the average gas price by the number of units
of gas needed to execute SB submission contract (namely, ≈335K gwei) and then convert gwei to USD. In
our case, we will use the average ETH-USD exchange rate between 2020-07-06 and 2020-08-13 (i.e., the time
interval when the empirical gas prices were collected), which was equal to 302.05 USD per 1 ETH [103] or
3.02× 10−7 USD per 1 gwei.
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